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Credible Deterrence and Consumer Protection through 
the Imposition of Financial Penalties: Lessons for the 
Financial Conduct Authority 
 
Peter Cartwright* 
 
Abstract:  
Protecting the consumer is one of the principal objectives of financial regulation. One of 
the main ways by which regulators seek to achieve that protection is by deterring 
harmful conduct by firms. In this essay, Peter Cartwright examines deterrence in theory 
DQGSUDFWLFHDVVHVVLQJWKH)&$¶VFKDPSLRQLQJRI³FUHGLEOHGHWHUUHQFH´DQGFRQVLGHULQJ 
the extent to which such an approach is, and should be, used by the regulator.  
 
Introduction 
One of the main objectives of Financial Regulation is to protect the consumer.1  It is 
widely assumed that without some intervention from the state, consumers will be liable 
to suffer detriment.  Debate therefore tends to focus on the ways in which such 
protection might best be secured, rather than whether intervention is necessary at all. 
 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of ZKDWKDVEHHQODEHOOHGµcredible 
deteUUHQFH¶ in financial regulation. The essay focuses, in particular, on the use of 
financial penalties to protect consumers from misconduct by firms. Such examination is 
especially WRSLFDOIRUDQXPEHURIUHDVRQV)LUVWWKH8.¶VSULQFLSDOFRQGXFWUHJXODWRU, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has committed itself to the policy of credible 
deterrence championed by its predecessor, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).2 
Second, this is taking place against a background of increasing interest in the part that 
                                          
Professor of Consumer Protection Law, School of Law, University of Nottingham. I would like to thank Richard 
Hyde and Joanna Gray for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
1
 See e.g. G. Benston, µ&RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQDV-XVWLILFDWLRQIRU5HJXODWLQJ)LQDQFLDO-Services Firms and 
3URGXFWV¶, Journal of Financial Services Research 17(3), 2000, 277; P. Cartwright, Banks Consumers and 
Regulation, Oxford: Hart, 2004; P. Cartwright, Consumer Protection in Financial Services,  Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Law International, 1999; Consumers International, In Search of Good Practices in Financial Consumer 
Protection, February 2013; D, Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation,  London: FSA, 
April 1999); N. Moloney, How to Protect Investors, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; World 
Bank, Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection (June 2012). 
2
 ,QWKHZRUGVRIWKH)&$¶V'LUHFWRURI(QIRUFHPHQWDQG)LQDQFLDO&ULPHµWKH)&$LVMXVWDs committed to 
DFKLHYLQJFUHGLEOHGHWHUUHQFHDVWKH)6$ZDV¶Tracey McDermott, ³(QIRUFHPHQWDQG&UHGLEOH'HWHUUHQFHLQ
WKH)&$´7KRPSVRQ5HXWHUV&RPSOLDQFHDQG5LVN6XPPLW/RQGRQ, 18 June 2013 
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penalties (broadly understood) should play in regulatory regimes.3 Third, the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards has set out extremely important 
proposals to enable trust to be restored in banking.4 Some of these proposals concern 
how to improve standards through sanctioning. The essay begins by examining the 
concept of deterrence in theory, before considering the FC$¶VDSSURDFKWRHQVXULQJ
credible deterrence by the imposition of financial penalties. It then identifies several 
concerns with credible deterrence, both in theory and in practice. Next, the essay 
considers how these concerns might be addressed. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
Part One: Deterrence 
 
Deterrence in Theory 
The academic work on deterrence frequently focuses on deterrence by the imposition of 
sanctions, particularly in the form of penalties imposed by the criminal law.5 However, 
deterrence also features prominently as an objective of administrative monetary 
penalties KHUHDIWHU³ILQDQFLDOSHQDOWLHV´) such as those imposed under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) regime.6 It is often assumed that the actual or 
threatened imposition of sanctions (including financial penalties) can deter wrongdoing. 
This assumption applies both to individuals and to firms.  For example, Wells argues 
WKDWµ[m]ost corporate crime theory has been deterrent-based, in the sense that the 
purpose of instituting sanctions has been to discourage violations and encourage good 
SUDFWLFH¶.7 Deterrence may be specific, where the focus is on deterring a particular 
person (firm or individual) from future wrongdoing, or general, which concerns deterring 
others from engaging in similar conduct. In both cases the assumption is made that the 
imposition (or potential imposition) of a penalty incentivises compliance through the 
threat it makes. Both forms of deterrence are mentioned in WKH)&$¶V'HFLVLRQ3URFHGXUH
and Penalties Manual (DEPP).8  
 
                                          
3
 See in particular R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-Hampton World, London: Cabinet 
Office, 2006. 
4
 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Changing Banking for Good, London: Stationery Office, 
HC 27-1, HC 175-1 June 2013. 
5
 See e.g. G. Becker, µ&ULPHDQG3XQLVKPHQWDQ(FRQRPLF$SSURDFK¶, Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1968, 
169;  C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. The 
FCA, like its predecessor can prosecute for a variety of criminal offences but doing so is rare. In 2012-13 the 
Authority concluded just four trials, which resulted in 13 criminal convictions. 12 of these were for insider 
dealing and one was related to unauthorised business. See FSA, Enforcement Annual Performance Account 
2012-2013, p. 5. 7KH)&$¶VDSSURDFKWR prosecution is set out in the Enforcement Guide chap 12. 
6
 See generally FCA, Decision Procedures and Penalties Manual (DEPP) p 6 and FCA, The Enforcement Guide 
chap 7. 
7
 Wells op. cit, p 31. 
8
 Op. cit para 6.1.2. 
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One question for a financial regulator is how it should use the enforcement tools it has at 
its disposal.9 Financial regulators, like others with enforcement functions, can adopt 
different enforcement strategies based on their objectives. One of these has been 
labelled a µdeterrence¶ or µsanctioning¶ strategy. The aim of such a strategy has been said 
to be: 
 
µto secure conformity with the law by detecting violation, determining who is 
responsible for the violation, and penalising violations to deter violations in the 
future, either by those who are punished or by those who might do so were 
YLRODWLRQVQRWSHQDOLVHG¶10  
 
Individuals and firms could both be the subject of such an approach. However, it has 
been argued that firms may be more likely than individuals to make rational decisions 
aimed at maximizing financial gain. According to Ramsay:11 
 
µwhile criminals generally do not carefully calculate the probable consequences of 
their actions and therefore are often not deterred by the threat of punishment, 
this cannot be said of the corporate criminal. Since corporate activity is normally 
undertaken in order to reap some economic benefit, corporate decision makers 
choose courses of action based on a calculation of potential costs anGEHQHILWV¶ 
 
Gobert and Punch suggest similarly that companies may be µthe prime example of the 
rational cost benefit calculators which those who champion deterrence theory had in 
PLQG¶12 Economic models have been developed to try to establish when to take formal 
enforcement action and what penalty to seek or impose, based on assumptions about 
probable behaviour.13 The extent to which these models reflect the behaviour of firms 
depends in part on the motivation and character of the firm in question. Kagan and 
Scholz divide firms into different categories such as political citizens, amoral calculators 
and the organisationally incompetent.14 Amoral FDOFXODWRUVDUHWKRVHZKRDUHµmotivated 
entirely by profit-VHHNLQJ¶DQGZKRµcarefully and competently assess opportunities and 
                                          
9
 The question of what sort of tools the regulator should have is an important one but beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
10
 A.J. Reiss, µSelecting Strategies of Social CRQWURO2YHU2UJDQLVDWLRQDO/LIH¶, in K. Hawkins and J. Thomas 
(eds) Enforcing Regulation,  Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 23-24. 
11
 I. Ramsay, µDevelopmeQWVLQWKH/DZ&RUSRUDWH&ULPH¶, (1978-79) 92 Harvard Law Review 92, 1978-79,  
1227, p. 1231 
12
 J. Gobert and M. Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime, London: Lexis Nexis, 2003, p. 219. 
13
 Most famous is Becker op. cit. It should be noted that some penalties are within the power of the regulator 
whereas others will rest with external institutions such as the courts. 
14
 R. Kagan and J. Schloz µ7KH³&ULPLQRORJ\RIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ´DQG5HJXODWRry Enforcement Strategies¶ in  
Hawkins and Thomas op.cit, p. 67. 
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ULVNV¶.15 These are akin to the rational cost benefit calculators envisaged by Gobert and 
Punch. For these firms in particular, it could be argued that regulators should focus on 
pursuing deterrence.  
 
Characterisation of firms as falling within a particular category can therefore inform 
UHJXODWRUV¶UHVSRQVHV to their conduct. An amoral calculator will in theory be deterred 
from breaking the law if a cost-benefit analysis suggests that it is better to comply than 
to contravene.  To use a simplified model, it will comply with the law where pD>U. This 
is where p is the perceived likelihood of having the contravention identified and a penalty 
imposed, D is the perceived level of detriment that results from the contravention, and U 
is the perceived benefit from contravention.16 On this basis, the principal factors that 
deter contravention are the probability of enforcement action (as perceived by the firm) 
and the level of detriment that it perceives will result. From the perspective of a 
regulator, it is far cheaper for the level of penalty (which forms part of D) to be raised 
than for the intensity of enforcement action (which forms part of p) to be raised. 
Whether the regulator has similar control over these variables will depend on a range of 
factors. For example, where the criminal law is concerned, any penalty will be imposed 
by the criminal FRXUWVUDWKHUWKDQWKHUHJXODWRULWVHOIDQGVRODUJHO\EH\RQGWKHODWWHU¶V
control.  
 
Deterrence strategies might be championed on the assumption that (some) firms will 
engage in a cost benefit analysis of whether to contravene or comply. By demonstrating 
a willingness to take formal action, for example through the imposition of penalties, the 
regulator is making a clear statement to the firm in question, as well as to others, that it 
will not tolerate contravention. It is clear that there is strong support at the FCA for 
focusing on deterrence.     
 
Credible Deterrence and Enforcement at the FCA 
The FCA sees what it calls µcredible deterrence¶ as a central element in its approach to 
enforcement. In 7KH)&$¶V$SSURDFKWR$GYDQFLQJLWV2EMHFWLYHV the Authority defined 
credible deterrence as follows:17 
 
µthis is the strategy behind FCA enforcement that we use to deter firms and 
individuals from operating in a way that can harm the industry or consumers, by 
making it clear that there are real and meaningful consequences for those who 
                                          
15
 Ibid p. 67. 
16
 See Becker op. cit and A, Ogus.Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1994, chap. 5. 
17
 FCA, 7KH)&$¶V$SSURDFKWR$GYDQFLQJLWV2EMHFWLYHs, London: FCA, July 2013, p. 48.  
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breach our principles or rules. It includes sanctions such as civil action, criminal 
prosecution, fines, prohibitions, and publishing details of misconduct on our 
ZHEVLWH¶ 
 
The FSA had also placed significant emphasis on credible deterrence some years before 
it was replaced by the FCA. For example, in 2009, the )6$¶Vthen Director of 
Enforcement championed credible deterrence, saying that it was about making people 
µVLWXSDQGSD\DWWHQWLRQ¶18 Furthermore, wKHQVXPPDULVLQJWKH)6$¶VDSSURDFKWRLWV
HQIRUFHPHQWIXQFWLRQLQLWVILQDO\HDURIRSHUDWLRQ7UDFH\0F'HUPRWWQRZWKH)&$¶V
Director of Enforcement and Financial Crime) stated that tKH)6$¶VDSSURDFKµhas been 
to achieve credible deterrence regarding our Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 
mandate.¶19 More recently, she has emphasLVHGWKDWµthe FCA is just as committed to 
achieving credLEOHGHWHUUHQFHDVWKH)6$ZDV¶20 If anything, the FCA appears to be 
placing even greater emphasis on credible deterrence as part of its enforcement and 
disciplinary strategy.  
 
Financial Penalties and the FCA 
As is made clear in the extract above, FCA has a range of powers that might deter 
misconduct. They include prohibitions and public censure as well as the financial 
penalties that are the principal focus of this piece. In exercising its power to issue a 
financial penalty, the FCA must have regard to the relevant provisions in the FCA 
Handbook, and to guidance published in the Handbook and set out in the Regulatory 
Guides, in particular DEPP. DEPP provides that the principal purpose of imposing a 
financial penalty is to: 
 
µpromote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring 
persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping 
to deter other persons from committing similar breaches, and demonstrating 
generally the benefits of compliant behaviour¶ 21  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the FCA sees the imposition of a financial penalty as central to 
achieving its policy of credible deterrence. However, it is also possible to identify 
significant concerns with the use of financial penalties to achieve such deterrence, both 
in theory and in practice. These are now considered. 
 
                                          
18
 M. Cole, µ'HOLYHULQJ&UHGLEOH'HWHUUHQFH¶, FSA Annual Crime Conference 27th April 2009. 
19
 FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit, p. 5. 
20
 McDermott, op.cit. 
21
 DEPP 6.1.2 G. 
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Part Two: Some Concerns with Credible Deterrence in Theory and 
Practice 
Credible deterrence lies at the heart of the )&$¶Venforcement strategy. It is perhaps 
understandable that regulators should wish to project an image of themselves as 
fearless enforcers. This is particularly the case for those organisations that have been 
criticised for alleged laxity of supervision and enforcement. The FSA, for example, was 
DYRZHGO\µOLJKWWRXFK¶ but was claimed by some critics to be µVRIWWRXFK¶.22 Against the 
background of a global financial crisis and widespread concern about financial 
misconduct, it is to be expected that a financial regulator would wish to demonstrate its 
authority. It is also clear that the Regulator accepts the essential premise of deterrence 
outlined above. In WKHZRUGVRI7UDFH\0F'HUPRWWµTo achieve credible deterrence, 
wrongdoers must not only realise that they face a real and tangible risk of being held to 
account, but must also expect to face a meaningful sanctions.¶23 However, this focus on 
credible deterrence raises a number of significant concerns. 
 
 
Types of Firm and (Dis)Proportionality  
While theories of optimal deterrence are based primarily on a vision of firms as amoral 
calculators, many firms will not adopt a cost-benefit analysis of the type envisaged. 
Firms comply with the law for a host of reasons other than the fear of receiving a 
sanction. These reasons include a sense of duty and habit, and also a respect for the rule 
of law.24 Ayres and Braithwaite have commented that a majority of firms will comply 
with the law most of the time µEHFDXVHLWLVWKHODZ¶25 The reluctance of many regulators 
to take enforcement action as a matter of course is based in part on the assumption that 
most firms are motivated to comply and that most contraventions are not calculated.26 
The optimal deterrence model outlined above is therefore of limited utility where a firm 
is not inclined deliberately to flout the law. In practice, many contraventions occur where 
firms act without due skill and care rather than on the basis of conscious decision-
making, and it is arguably difficult to deter negligence. Many breaches of FSMA occur 
where firms lack inadequate controls, supervision and organisation rather than where 
they display wilful misconduct.  
                                          
22
 µDays of soft-touch regulation are over, says FSA chairman¶, interview with Adair Turner, The Guardian 16 
October 2008. 
23
 FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit. 
24
 See for example I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; N. Gunningham, R. Kagan and R. Thornton, µ*HQHUDO'HWHUUHQFH
DQG&RUSRUDWH%HKDYLRXU¶Law and Policy 27, 2005, 262. 
25
 Ayres and Braithwaite, ibid p. 19. Note also C Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997, chap. two. 
26
 See below. 
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Where breaches result from inadvertence rather than anything more sinister, there are 
questions about whether a focus on deterrence is appropriate. There are two principal 
objections: first that a focus on deterrence in such circumstances is ineffective (and even 
counterproductive) and second that it is unfair (which may, in turn, lead to it being even 
less effective). 
 
In terms of effectiveness, it has been noted that the logic underpinning optimal 
deterrence is lost where firms are not making decisions whether to comply. Some recent 
empirical research questions the extent to which punitive approaches to regulation are 
effective in encouraging compliance on the part of typical firms. Baldwin comments as 
follows: 
 
µCorSRUDWLRQV«ZLOORIWHQEHFRQIXVHGDQGLUUDWLRQDODERXWSXQLWLYHULVNVWKHLUVWDII
may conflate individual and corporate liabilities; they may be poorly organised to 
deal with, anticipate or react to punitive risks and the effects of sanctions; their 
Boards may under-perform in supervising or providing leadership on punitive risk 
management and they may be poorly placed to assess how they and their staff 
aUHSHUIRUPLQJDVULVNPDQDJHUV¶27 
 
This raises a number of issues about the relationship between compliance, deterrence 
and risk management. In part, it reflects the idea that many firms may best be classed 
as organisationally incompetent ± inclined to obey the law but potentially fallible. 
Thinking in terms of optimal (or credible) deterrence does not fit easily with the 
organisationally incompetent firm. The firm is not choosing to transgress, and so it 
cannot easily be deterred from so doing. Indeed, it is possible to go further and say that 
a deterrence strategy is not only liable to be ineffective in securing compliance where 
such firms are concerned, but may be counterproductive. One reason for this is that the 
over-zealous use of enforcement may make firms less inclined to co-operate with 
regulators. Shapiro and Rabinowitz argue that µif the government punishes companies in 
circumstances where managers believe that there has been good faith compliance, 
corporate officers may react by being less co-operDWLYHZLWKUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHV¶28 Ayres 
and Braithwaite provide additional support for this view, suggesting that focusing heavily 
on formal eQIRUFHPHQWLVOLDEOHWRIRVWHUµan organised business subculture of resistance 
WRUHJXODWLRQ¶.29  Similar views have been expressed by commentators in a number of 
                                          
27
 R. Baldwin, µ7KH1HZ3XQLWLYH5HJXODWLRQ¶, Modern Law Review 67(3), 2004, 351 p. 369. 
28S. Shapiro and R. Rabinowitz, µ3XQLVKPHQWYHUVXV&R-operation in Regulatory Enforcement: a Case Study of 
2+6$¶, Administrative Law Review 14, 1997, 714 p. 718. 
29
 Ayres and Braithwaite op. cit p. 20. 
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different areas.30 Adopting punishment as a first-choice strategy may be seen as 
µunaffordable, unworkable, and counter-productive in undermining the good will of those 
wLWKDFRPPLWPHQWWRFRPSOLDQFH¶31 In addition, it risks the loss of socially useful 
activity as firms may choose to exit the market in question. 
 
The second objection to a focus on deterrence for firms who lack the intent to 
contravene is that such a focus is simply unfair, regardless of any impact it might have. 
There is a danger of penalties being formally imposed which do not reflect the culpability 
of the firm. Even where the formal sanction is a financial penalty, SDUWRIWKHµVWLQJ¶ of 
the sanction may be the negative publicity that results from its imposition. The danger of 
disproportionality is particularly apparent in such circumstances, given that the impact of 
adverse publicity is determined not formally by the regulator or the courts, but instead 
by what has been described as WKHµcaSULFLRXVMXU\RISXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶.32 Where the 
consequences of particular enforcement action are excessive, that action will presumably 
(and perhaps inevitably) be disproportionate. Some commentators have argued that 
ZKLOHUHJXODWRUVVKRXOGWDNHDFFRXQWRISURSRUWLRQDOLW\µWKHPRVWWKDWLVUHTXLUHGWR
satisfy the principle of proportionality is formal proportionate quantification of sentence 
LQDGYDQFHLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHGHJUHHRILPSDFWXSRQDQRIIHQGHU¶33 This seems 
questionable. If it is anticipated by the regulator that particular action is likely to have a 
disproportionate impact on a particular firm, it seems difficult to argue that the enforcer 
has met its duty to act in a proportionate manner.  
 
Effectiveness of Deterrence where firms are amoral calculators 
A second concern is that, to the extent that there are rational firms adopting a cost-
benefit analysis, it is doubtful that such firms will be deterred by the actions of 
regulators, whether that action be prosecution and the subsequent imposition of a 
(criminal) fine, or the imposition of a (civil) financial penalty. Most of the research in this 
area focuses on the use of the criminal rather than civil law. Some such research has 
emphasised that the likelihood of firms¶ being pursued and penalised is very small. 
Looking at regulatory offences generally, Ogus estimates that criminal prosecutions 
account for no more than 0.05% of reported contraventions.34  There are various 
                                          
30
 See E. Bardach and R. Kagan Going by the Book: the Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1982; G. Richardson, A. Ogus and P. Burroughs, Policing Pollution,  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982 p. 126 and R. Cranston, Regulating Business: Law and Consumer Agencies, London: 
Macmillan, 1979. 
31
 Ayres and Braithwaite op. cit p. 26. 
32
 B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1983, p.310 
33
 Ibid, p. 310. 
34
 A. 2JXVµ%HWWHU5HJXODWLRQ-%HWWHU(QIRUFHPHQW¶, in S. Weatherill (ed) Better Regulation, Oxford: Hart, 2007, 
p. 111. 
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reasons for this, but one (emphasised by Macrory in Regulatory Justice) is the resource-
intensive nature of prosecution.35 Not only is the probability of apprehension and formal 
action such as prosecution low, but it is also likely that firms realise this to be the case.36 
As a result, the value of p is likely to be low. By the same token, where penalties are 
imposed, the level of those penalties is typically low (and probably realised to be so). For 
example, Macrory quotes the average fine imposed for prosecutions brought by the 
Environment Agency in 2005 as being just over £5000.37 In its major report Changing 
Banking for Good the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards argued that 
ZKHUHWKH)6$¶VDFWLRns against banks were FRQFHUQHGµthe credibility of enforcement 
has been damaged by a legacy of fines that were pitiful compared to the benefits banks 
gained from the misconduct¶.38 While D does not consist only of the level of formal 
penalty but also other forms of detriment (such as the inconvenience of dealing with 
enforcement action, any negative publicity arising from such action and so on) it is 
doubtful that this will be perceived as sufficiently significant to amount to a credible 
deterrent. On this basis a rational firm may conclude that the benefits of contravention 
(U) outweigh the costs. The need to ensure that penalties are sufficient to deter is 
considered below. 
 
It could be argued that where criminal (rather than civil) financial penalties are 
concerned there is an added weight to the penalty because of the stigma attached to the 
criminal label. Indeed, it has been VXJJHVWHGWKDWEXVLQHVVSHRSOHµDEKRU¶ the label of 
criminality.39 But this can be over-stated. First, regulatory offences will often be treated 
as µnot criminal in any real sense¶, both by defendants and by the public.40 This implies 
that even where members of the public (for example, consumers) realise that an offence 
has been committed, they do not attribute significant stigma to the wrongdoer. Second, 
it is doubtful that the public in practice distinguishes between whether the penalty was 
criminal or civil. 7KHZRUGµSHQDOW\¶ is nHXWUDOLQWKLVUHJDUGDQGHYHQµILQH¶ can be used 
to encompass criminal and civil financial penalties. Whether a criminal penalty is more 
likely than a civil sanction to be given publicity (for example by the regulator) is unclear. 
 
The issue of proportionality is also relevant where amoral calculators are concerned. 
There may be an argument for imposing a penalty whenever there is intentional 
                                          
35
 Macrory op. cit.para 2.2. 
36
 Although not necessarily. See L. A. Bebchuk and L. Kaplow, µ2SWLPal sanctions when individuals are 
imperfectly informed about WKHSUREDELOLW\RIDSSUHKHQVLRQ¶  Journal of Legal Studies 21 1992, 365. 
37
 Macrory op. cit table 2.1. 
38
 Op. cit para 231. 
39
 H. Ball and L. )ULHGPDQµUse of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: a 
6RFLRORJLFDO9LHZ¶, Stanford Law Review 17, 1965, 197 pp. 216-217 
40
 A phrase from Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 at 922. 
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wrongdoing. However, for that penalty credibly to deter the amoral calculator, it might 
have to be so high that it seems disproportionate to the wrongdoing. Indeed, there is a 
danger RIZKDWKDVEHHQODEHOOHGWKHµGHWHUUHQFHWUDS¶ where to be an effective 
deterrent, a penalty may be so high as to put a firm out of business, a result which will 
frequently not be justified.41 The balance between providing a penalty that is likely to 
deter, and ensuring that any such penalty is not disproportionate to the wrongdoing, is 
frequently difficult to find. 
 
A further point to consider is that where the process involved does not involve all the 
safeguards associated with a criminal trial, it may be more likely that mistakes are 
made.42 Despite the undoubted safeguards provided in the area of financial services, this 
remains a concern.  
 
Consequentialism 
Finally, the focus on deterrence suggests that imposing penalties is primarily 
consequentialist.43 The FCA appears to assume that positive consequences can be 
achieved by imposing penalties and that this justifies their imposition. This  is illustrated, 
at least to some extent, by some of the principles which underpin the )&$¶VDSSURDFKWR
its enforcement powers. In particular, principle four states that:44 
 
µThe FCA will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its 
action, to deter future non-compliance by others, to eliminate any financial gain 
or benefit from non-compliance, and where appropriate, to remedy the harm 
caused by non-FRPSOLDQFH¶ 
 
This wording may be familiar to some readers. It reflects the Penalties Principles set out 
by Macrory in Regulatory Justice.45 Tracey McDermott, in commenting RQWKH)6$¶V
enforcement in its last year of operation said: µ[w]e have focused on cases where we 
think we can make a real difference to consumers and markets, using enforcement 
strategically as a tool to change behaviour in the financial services industry.¶46 It is 
understandable that a regulator would wish to focus on consequences. The public 
expects regulators to achieve results and a focus on this will typically be desirable. 
However, it would be concerning if that were the only driver. There are strong 
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 Although perhaps not always. See R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings [2011] EWCA Crim. 1337. 
42
 2JXVµ%HWWHU5HJXODWLRQ¶RSFLWS 
43
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particular objective such as a change in behaviour.  
44
 FCA Enforcement Guide op. cit para 2.2. 
45
 Macrory op. cit. 
46
 FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit. 
 11 
 
arguments that imposing penalties can also have a symbolic role in demonstrating 
censure and that they should be based, at least in part, on the idea of deserts. This may 
be particularly true of penalties imposed under the criminal law, but might also be true 
of other penalties. While DEPP does make reference to matters that might be described 
as non-consequentialist or retributive, the focus and balance appears consequentialist, 
and the tone of credible deterrence certainly is.47 The more serious the wrongdoing, the 
more important it is that sanctions reflect that seriousness, regardless of (or perhaps in 
addition to) any aim of achieving deterrence.48 Seriousness is made up of two principal 
elements: the extent and/or type of harm, and the degree of culpability.49 A sanctioning 
regime, be it criminal or civil, needs to be willing to impose penalties that reflect that 
seriousness, even in circumstances where it cannot be assumed it will change conduct in 
the future.  
 
 
Part Three: Addressing the Concerns 
This section looks at how we might address the concerns raised by a focus on credible 
deterrence. It considers how deterrence might be made more effective; how different 
types of firm might be treated; how proportionality can be achieved, and how 
sanctioning needs to reflect concepts that might be described as non-consequentialist. It 
will become clear that in practice, the FCA does look beyond credible deterrence and 
address a number of these issues, despite its apparent focus on the concept.  
 
Effectiveness 
The first issue to consider is the concern that deterrence is unlikely to be effective (and 
therefore credible) even for amoral calculators. This might be addressed in a number of 
ways. 
 
Increasing the Value of p 
First, for deterrence strategies to work firms must believe that there is a realistic 
prospect of their being pursued, investigated and sanctioned for wrongdoing. To a large 
extent this depends in the approach the regulator takes to supervision and, in particular, 
to trying to identify breacKHV7KH)&$¶VDSSURDFKLVULVN-based, and resources are 
                                          
47
 See below. 
48
 Retributive theories which focus on punishment as a morally appropriate response to wrongdoing incorporate 
the need for punishment to be consequentialist in the sense of also deterring crime. See A Ashworth 
µ6HQWHQFLQJ¶LQ0. Maguire, R. Morgan and R Reiner The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2nd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 1096-1097. 
49
 Culpability will typically be concerned with mens rea but will sometimes be broadened to include attitude and 
motivation. See for example the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
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deployed on the basis of perceived threats to its regulatory objectives. In relation to its 
overall approach to supervision, the FCA states:50 
 
µThe FCA will adopt a pre-emptive approach which will be based on making 
forward-looking judgments about firms' business models, product strategy and 
how they run their businesses, to enable the FCA to identify and intervene earlier 
to prevent problems crystallising.¶ 
 
In addition, the FCA has stated that its supervision model is inter alia: µforward looking 
DQGPRUHLQWHUYHQWLRQLVW«FRQVXPHU-FHQWULF«UREXVWZKHQWKLQJVJRZURQJ«>DQG@
viewing poor behaviour in all markets through the lens of impact on consumers.¶51 This 
suggests a qualitatively different attitude to supervision from that taken by its 
predecessor. Coupled with the focus the FCA has said it places on firms (and sectors) 
that could cause, or are causing, harm to consumers or that threaten market integrity, it 
is plausible to argue that in future firms will believe it more likely that wrongdoing will be 
identified and responded to. There is strong support for a greater focus on enforcement 
action in Changing Banking for Good. The Report argues that:52 
 
µGreater priority needs to be placed on the role of enforcement, with adequate 
resources devoted to this function and leadership with a willingness to pursue 
even the difficult cases, often involving the larger and more powerful players, in 
order to build up a credible deterrent effect¶ 
 
In terms of whether the response of the FCA involves a financial penalty, the factors that 
the organisation will consider when deciding whether to take action for a financial 
penalty are set out in DEPP, although the FCA recognizes that the list is not exhaustive 
and that some will not be applicable in specific cases.53 The factors are: the nature, 
seriousness and impact of the suspected breach; the conduct of the person after the 
breach; the previous disciplinary record and compliance history of the person; FCA 
guidance and other published materials; action taken by the FSA or FCA in previous 
similar cases; and action taken by other domestic or international regulatory 
authorities.54 This demonstrates that a decision to impose a penalty is a matter of 
judgement to be taken on the basis of a range of criteria. As will be seen later, it also 
calls into doubt the centrality of deterrence to decision making. 
                                          
50
 SUP 1A 3.1. 
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 SUP 1A 3.2.G 
52
 Op. cit vol 1 para 247 
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 DEPP 6.2.1. The same factors apply to public censure.  
54
 DEPP 6.2.1 (G). 
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The FSA had previously recognized the need to demonstrate more clearly a willingness 
to take action if deterrence was to be made more credible. One possible concern is that 
the FSA imposed fewer fines (as it referred to them) in 2012-13 (51) than it had in 
either of the previous two financial years.55 So the focus on credible deterrence had not 
led to a greater number of fines being imposed. Despite this reduction, the FCA has 
stated that its approach to meeting the consumer protection objective through credible 
deterrence is to be achieved in part by bringing more enforcement cases.56 Where this is 
communicated effectively to those who might consider contravention, it raises the value 
of p in the model above. While it is true that firms may still not have an accurate picture 
of the value of p, this is not fatal to the success of deterrence. Indeed, it has been noted 
that for general deterrence to succeed, what matters is the perception of the risk of 
action being taken.57 OgXVIRUH[DPSOHVXJJHVWVWKDWµif traders generally perceive the 
value of p to be significantly higher than in reality is the case, there is no reason to 
disturb this impression if it can contribute tRDKLJKHUOHYHORIFRPSOLDQFH¶58 In practice, 
it seems unlikely that well-informed firms will consider it more likely that they will face 
action unless there is in fact an increase.  
 
Increasing the Value of D 
Second, for deterrence to be credible there is a need to demonstrate that where 
contravention is established, meaningful detriment is likely to follow. The most obvious 
component of D is the penalty imposed as a result of contravention.  
 
DEPP sets out some of the factors to be taken into account when determining the level of 
penalty that is appropriate and proportionate to the misconduct. The regime for penalty- 
setting is based upon three principles: disgorgement; discipline and deterrence. 
Disgorgement means that a firm (or individual) should not benefit from the breach, 
discipline means that they should be penalised for any wrongdoing, and deterrence 
means that any penalty imposed µshould deter the firm or individual who committed the 
breach, and others, from committiQJIXUWKHURUVLPLODUEUHDFKHV¶59  
 
It is difficult to assess whether the penalties imposed upon firms are sufficient to 
contribute towards credible deterrence. As noted above, this seems doubtful where firms 
                                          
55
 There were also fewer prohibitions than in previous years. See FSA Enforcement Annual Performance 
Account op.cit. 
56
 FCA 7KH)&$¶V$SSURDFKWR$GYDQFLQJLWV2EMHFWLYHV op. cit p 19. 
57
 S Simpson Corporate Crime and Social Control Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, especially 
chap. 2. 
58
 2JXVµ%HWWHU5HJXODWLRQ¶RSFLWS 
59
 DEPP 6.5.3 G. 
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are amoral calculators. However, there is some evidence of a recent willingness to 
increase financial penalties. The FSA imposed £423.2 million in financial penalties during 
the year 2012-13.60 Subject to the points made about proportionality, there is a strong 
argument for penalties to be high. Despite the limitations of the economic approach to 
sanctioning set out above, it seems reasonable to argue that for those firms who either 
take a conscious decision to engage, or who risk engaging, in wrongdoing, higher 
penalties are more likely to deter than lower ones. There remain doubts about whether 
the financial penalties currently imposed fulfil this, and the question of whether the 
figures are skewed by action concerning LIBOR is important, but the FCA should receive 
some credit for the advances that appear to have been made.61 Furthermore, the FCA 
has also explained that it proposes to use credible deterrence to achieve its consumer 
protection objective in part by bringing more enforcement cases and pressing for tough 
penalties for infringements of rules so it is likely that this will continue.62 Indeed 
Changing Banking for Good argued that both the FCA and the PRA should further review 
again their penalty setting framework µto allow for a further substantial increase in 
fines¶.63 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of a move towards the imposition of higher financial 
penalties is the £28 million fine imposed by the FCA upon Lloyds Banking Group 
(specifically Lloyds TSB Bank plc and Bank of Scotland plc) in December 2013 for serious 
failings in their controls over sales incentive schemes.64 It is the largest ever fine 
imposed by the FCA or FSA, for failings in retail conduct of business. The FCA 
investigated advised sales of investment and protection products between 1 January 
2010 and 31 March 2012. It found that the firms had µhigher risk features in their 
DGYLVHUV¶ILQDQFLDOLQFHQWLYHVFKHPHVZKLFKZHUHQRWSURSHUO\FRQWUROOHG¶.65 This provided 
a significant risk that advisers would sell products to customers that they neither needed 
nor wanted in order to maintain or increase their salaries. Over the period in question, 
the firms sold £2.25bn of investment products and received £118m in protection 
insurance premiums. Although they agreed to settle at an early stage (and so qualified 
for a 20 per cent discount) the FCA  increased the fine by 10 per cent because of 
                                          
60
 In 2011-12 it was just 76.4m. See FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit.  
61
 Changing Banking for Good described the precedent set by the fines imposed in relation to LIBOR as 
µHQFRXUDJLQJ¶RSFLWSDUD. 
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 Op cit para 231. 
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SUHYLRXVZDUQLQJVDERXWWKHXVHRISRRUO\PDQDJHGLQFHQWLYHVFKHPHVDQGWKHILUPV¶
previous disciplinary record.66  
 
 
Refocusing D 
Discussion of deterrence strategies frequently takes place in the context of wrongdoing 
by firms and most of the discussion above has assumed that the recipient of a financial 
penalty will be a firm. It is notable that the FSA began to focus greater attention on 
individuals and the FCA has taken this forward. In 2013-13, the FSA took more actions 
against individuals than against firms, imposing over £5 million in fines.67  
 
This attention on individual liability is extremely important. Action against individuals will 
sometimes be more appropriate than that against firms. While recognizing that the 
primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with a firm's regulatory obligations is that 
of the firm, DEPP states that the FCA may take disciplinary action against an µapproved 
person¶ where there is evidence of personal culpability on his or her part. It continues by 
VD\LQJWKDWµPersonal culpability arises where the behaviour was deliberate or where the 
approved person's standard of behaviour was below that which would be reasonable in 
all the circumstances at the WLPHRIWKHFRQGXFWFRQFHUQHG¶68 
 
There has been increasing emphasis on the role of personal liability as a deterrent 
against wrongdoing by firms.69 There is concern that a focus on the firm as a legal 
person raises particular difficulties. First, it is sometimes difficult to attach culpability to 
a business. This is particularly so where the criminal law is concerned, because of the 
nature of corporate criminal liability (where it is notoriously difficult to attach liability for 
offences requiring proof of mens rea, and may also be problematic where strict liability 
offences are accompanied by defences of due diligence).70 Fault (broadly understood) 
may exist within companies in different ways and at different levels. This has been 
starkly revealed where the criminal law is invoked against often large and complex firms. 
Attempts have been made to capture wrongdoing for the purposes of attributing fault, 
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 Lloyds TSB Bank plc had been fined in 2003 for the unsuitable sale of bonds which had been caused in part 
because of inappropriate incentives. 
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 FSA Enforcement Annual Performance Account op.cit. 
68
 DEPP 6.2.4 (G). 
69
 Particularly in the context of corporate crime. See ; B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and 
Accountability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993,  pp. 158-162; Gobert and Punch op. cit chap 8; 
Wells op. cit.p 160-163. 
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 See e.g. P. Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001, chap. 4; Wells ibid; Fisse and Braithwaite ibid. 
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but it remains difficult.71 Second, as noted above, it is questionable whether a financial 
penalty against a firm is likely to have the same deterrent effect as a penalty against an 
individual. The former may be treated as little more than a business expense, whereas 
(depending on the precise penalty) the latter may lead not only to the individual losing 
his or her livelihood, but potentially their freedom where the criminal law is invoked. 
Where penalties are administrative rather than criminal, incarceration is not an issue, 
but loss of livelihood remains so. 
 
The FCA recognises that individuals will sometimes need to be targeted by a policy based 
on deterrence. In particular, the FCA has announced its determination to pursue senior 
managers who, in its words, fail to: µrecognise and manage the risk that their firm is 
running; control the way their products are sold; [and] ensure that the interests of 
consumers are at the heart oIWKRVHGHVLJQLQJQHZSURGXFWV¶72 This has been reinforced 
E\WKH)&$¶VVXEVHTXHQWVWDWHPHQWV,Q-XQHTracey McDermott VDLGWKDWµUHSHDWHG
fines for conduct failures here and overseas demonstrates that fining firms alone is not 
HQRXJK¶DQGWKDWµZHPXVWGRVRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQW,QRUGHUWRDFKLHYHFUHGLEOH
GHWHUUHQFHVHQLRUPDQDJHUVPXVWEHKHOGWRDFFRXQW¶73 It is submitted that the FCA is 
rightly concerned with individual fault. Fault is broader than the traditional criminal law 
concept of subjective mens rea, the latter incorporating concepts such as intention 
recklessness and dishonesty. As noted above, fault includes where the approved 
person's standard of behaviour was below that which would be reasonable in all the 
circumstances. This form of objective fault is important as it demonstrates that 
individuals must give thought to how their conduct will be viewed objectively. Individuals 
who fail to do that face personal consequences.  
 
It has long been accepted that individuals working within firms should take some 
responsibility for the actions of those firms. In the criminal law, this has largely taken 
the form of what might be called µVHQLRURIILFHU¶ provisions. Where an offence is 
committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the 
part of, such a senior officer, he, as well as the company, is guilty of the offence. While 
consent and connivance imply knowledge of circumstances, the reference to neglect 
makes it clear that there is an objective element to such a provision. The focus on 
individual liability adopted by the FCA is to be welcomed. Indeed, the push for increased 
emphasis on individual responsibility has come from Changing Banking for Good. The 
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Report makes a number of recommendations which would place greater and clearer 
responsibilities on individuals and, arguably, contribute to more effective deterrence. 
Among these is the suggestion that a µSenior Persons Regime¶ replace the Approved 
Persons Regime in respect of banks. Under this, all WKHµkey responsibilities¶ within a 
bank would be assigned to a specific and senior individual.74 This, it is suggested, would 
facilitate the identification of those most responsible for failures and make it easier to 
use enforcement powers against individuals. The Report also makes the case for 
legislation that would enable the regulators (both the FCA and PRA) to impose a wide 
range of civil sanctions (including a ban) on an individual µunless that person can 
demonstrate that he or she took all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the effects of 
a specified failing.¶75 This would apply where two conditions are present: first, the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VEDQNKDVEHHQVXEMHFWWo enforcement action that has either been settled or 
upheld by the Tribunal; and second, that the regulator can show that the individual held 
specific responsibilities under the Senior Persons Regime which were directly relevant to 
the enforcement action in question.76 This is a bold approach and one that cannot be 
investigated fully here. It echoes a due diligence defence in criminal law, where the 
defendant will be guilty unless he or she can demonstrate an absence of fault. However, 
it involves civil liability. Furthermore, the Report also recommends the creation of a new 
criminal offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank. Covering only 
those who are subject to the proposed Senior Persons Regime, the Report sees the 
offence as providing credible deterrence. In its words: µthe fact that recklessness in 
carrying out professional responsibilities carries a risk of a criminal conviction and a 
prison sentence would give pause for thought to the senior officers of UK banks.¶77 
Substantial fines can already be imposed as a civil penalty, with the advantage of a 
lower standard of proof. However, the proposed offence could provide more compelling 
deterrence, partly through the stigma attached to conviction but more significantly 
through the possibility of imprisonment.  
 
Rethinking D 
It has been noted above that D represents the detriment from contravention and so 
includes more than just the formal penalty. As D represents the cost to the defendant, it 
may include disruption, inconvenience and the cost of complying with the requirements 
of a regulator post wrongdoinJ%DOGZLQKDVHPSKDVLVHGWKDWµpenal effects may extend 
very considerably beyonGWKHOHYHORIDQ\ILQHLPSRVHG¶, suggesting that formal 
enforcement action may adversely affect reputation, cause operational disturbances and 
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managerial disruptions, worsen relationships between regulator and regulated and 
adversely affect investor relations.78 Similarly, Ogus recognises that costs from 
contravention include:79 
 
µthe hassle and personal inconvenience arising from encounters with the victims 
of regulatory contraventions and with public officials, legal and other defence 
expenditures, as well as any loss of market reputation resulting from the 
FRQWUDYHQWLRQEHLQJGHWHFWHG¶  
 
One element of D which is particularly important is the negative publicity that may arise 
from the contravention.80 Where there has been breach of the criminal law, and this is 
well-publicised, it may have a chilling effect on the defendant. Firms pay close attention 
to their image, and the label of criminal conviction may have a significant adverse effect 
upon this. As Ball and Friedman argue: µthe worG³FULPH´KDVV\PEROLFPHDQLQJIRUWKH
public and the criminal law is stained so deeply with notions of morality and immorality, 
public censure and punishment, that labelling an act as criminal often has consequences 
that go far beyond mere administrative HIIHFWLYHQHVV¶. They conclude that µbusinessmen 
abhor the iGHDRIEHLQJEUDQGHGDFULPLQDO¶, and that fear of prosecution is an effective 
deterrent to business people.81 While it is submitted that the stigma that attaches to 
prosecution and conviction (particularly in the regulatory sphere) is often overstated, 
there is little doubt that firms which value their public image will be concerned at having 
the label of criminality attached to them. 
 
Negative publicity does not only arise from breach of the criminal law. Indeed, as noted 
above, it is doubtful that the public distinguishes clearly between criminal sanctions and 
civil financial penalties. As a consequence, the well-publicised imposition of a civil 
penalty is likely to lead at least to some adverse publicity. Of course, to the extent that 
the public does not make this distinction concerns may arise. If WKHZRUGµcrime¶ does 
have symbolic meaning for the public, it is a matter of concern if the public treats non-
criminal penalties as carrying the same stigma as criminal penalties.  
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Furthermore, the FSA has well-developed sanctions that take advantage of the power of 
negative publicity. As well as being able to impose financial penalties (which may 
themselves generate publicity) the FSA is able to impose public censure as an alternative 
to such penalties.82 7KH)6$¶V*XLGDQFHVHWVRXWWKHIDFWRUVWREHFRQVLGHUHGZKHQ
deciding whether to impose public censure rather than a financial penalty. For example, 
the first factor is whether deterrence can be achieved effectively through a public 
censure. A second factor is whether the person has profited from, or avoided a loss 
from, the breach. A third factor is seriousness, with financial penalties (generally) being 
used in more serious cases. Fourth is that where the breach has been brought to the 
attention of the FSA by the person in question, it may make public censure more 
appropriate. Fifth, where the person admits the breach, fully co-operates with the FSA 
and takes steps to ensure that those who lose out receive compensation, again this may 
weigh in favour of merely public censure. Sixth, a poor disciplinary/compliance record is 
likely to point in favour of a financial penalty. The rationale for this is stated to be 
deterrence. Seventh, the FSA will look to ensure consistency in its approach, by 
considering previous cases. Finally, the FSA will consider the impact upon the person 
concerned. The factors reveal that public censure alone will typically be used in less 
serious cases, which may appear surprising given that negative publicity will in some 
cases provide a more compelling deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty.83  
 
It should also be noted that negative publicity can arise without the imposition of a 
sanction, but merely through the conveying of negative information. This is particularly 
apparent in the area of the publication of complaints data. The FCA requires firms to 
publish certain details and then publishes aggregate and firm-level data.84 The Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) also publishes data about the complaints with which it deals. 
While these would not, typically, be described as sanctions, still less penalties, they may 
have a chastening effect upon firms and therefore be viewed through the lens of 
deterrence.  
 
From U to D: Removing the Benefits of Contravention 
The FCA's penalty-setting regime is based on a number of principles, the first of which is  
disgorgement. 7KLVHFKRHVRQHRI0DFURU\¶Vµ3HQDOWLHV3ULQFLSOHV¶ in reflecting the idea 
that a firm or individual should not benefit from any breach.85 This is fundamental to the 
success of a penalties regime in instrumental terms, but also reflects the principle that 
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no-one should benefit from their wrongdoing. The model of optimal deterrence identifies 
the benefit from contravention as U. If U can be reduced or eliminated this improves 
deterrence, as well as potentially providing redress for consumers. 
 
There has been increasing interest in finding more creative ways of achieving this.86 
Consumer Redress Schemes are a particularly interesting topic for study in their own 
right. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider these in detail, but it is interesting 
to illustrate the role of the FCA in obtaining redress and its relationship with deterrence 
by referring to a recent development. In late 2013 the FCA reached an agreement with 
Card Protection Policy Ltd (CPP) and 13 high street banks and credit card issuers to pay 
redress to up to 7 million consumers who were the victims of misselling.87 CPP had 
already been fined £10.5m in November 2012 for failing to treat customers fairly. While 
some consumers had been sold the products directly by CPP others were introduced via 
the banks and credit card issuers. If approved by its creditors (a majority the consumers 
in question who vote) and confirmed by the High Court, this scheme of arrangement 
could lead to very substantial redress being paid. It is notable that when arguing that 
the financial services industry should not be subject to reforms providing redress to 
consumer from unfair commercial practices, the Law Commission justified this on the 
basis that in the financial services sector µthere are already sophisticated mechanisms in 
SODFHWRSURWHFWFRQVXPHUV¶ and that redress often goes well beyond the types envisaged 
by the Law Commission.88 
 
It is important for the FCA to ensure that consumer redress is achieved effectively and 
the power to require firms to establish consumer redress schemes is an important part of 
that. But such schemes can also be seen from the perspective of deterrence. The threat 
of being able to impose such a scheme allows the FCA to negotiate solutions with firms. 
As seen in other areas, the possession of significant enforcement tools will often allow 
solutions to be negotiated without the need for formal action.89 As the CPP example 
illustrates, it is possible to combine the imposition of a financial penalty with additional 
measures which have the effect of operating as a financial penalty, but which are 
characterised instead as redress. Where this occurs, the deterrent effect may be strong. 
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Types of Firm and Proportionality 
Considering Deterrence Where Intention is Lacking 
It was noted above that the model of optimal deterrence works best for amoral 
calculators. It assumes that firms choose whether to engage in wrongdoing and need to 
be deterred from so doing. But many businesses will not be quite so calculating in 
practice. It is important to consider to what extent, if at all, credible deterrence plays a 
role for other firms. 
 
The first point to note is that while the FCA has emphasised credible deterrence, it is 
clear that it takes a wide variety of factors into account when deciding whether, and 
how, WRXVHLWVSRZHUV$SLFWXUHRIWKLVLVSURYLGHGE\WKH)&$¶VEnforcement Guide 
ZKLFKLVSURGXFHGWRGHVFULEHWKH)&$¶VDSSURDFh to exercising its main enforcement 
SRZHUV)RXUPDLQSULQFLSOHVXQGHUSLQWKH)&$¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHXVHRILWVHQIRUFHPHQW
powers, the first three of which emphasise the need not to move immediately to formal 
enforcement. First, the FCA acknowledges that the effectiveness of the regime depends 
VLJQLILFDQWO\XSRQµmaintaining an open and co-operative relationship between the FCA 
DQGWKRVHLWUHJXODWHV¶ Second, the FCA states that it will seek to exercise its powers in 
a way that is µtransparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue and consistent with its 
publicl\VWDWHGSROLFLHV¶ Third, the FCA states that it will µseek to ensure fair treatment 
when exeUFLVLQJLWVHQIRUFHPHQWSRZHUV¶90 
 
This reveals an interesting contrast with the rhetoric that has been heard of late from 
the FCA (and before that from the FSA) about credible deterrence. It has always been 
clear that the regulator is under a duty to use its powers proportionately and the 
Enforcement Guide helps to explain what that means.  In practice, regulators are 
reluctant, and indeed unable, to pursue deterrence with the vigour that they sometimes 
imply. Optimal deterrence strategies of the type identified above are not representative 
of the approach of most regulators. The reality of regulatory enforcement is that 
regulators deploy possess, and deploy, a significant amount of bureaucratic discretion. In 
practice, what have been described as µcompliance strategies¶ are frequently utilised. A 
compliance strategy, sometimes referred to as µDGYLVHDQGSHUVXDGH¶KDVDVLWVDLPµto 
secure conformity with law by means of ensuring compliance or by taking action to 
prevent potential law violation without the necessity to detect, process and penalise 
YLRODWLRQV¶91 ,QWKHZRUGVRI+DZNLQVµits conception of enforcement centres upon the 
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attainment of the broad aims of legislation, rathHUWKDQVDQFWLRQLQJLWVEUHDFK¶92 As the 
)&$¶VFRPPHQWVDERYHGHPRQVWUDWHFompliance-based approaches remain very much in 
evidence. Where there has been a contravention a judgement has to be made about the 
appropriate regulatory response.  
 
The FCA makes the normative case for dealing with contravention without the need for 
formal discipline or other enforcement action. However, it does say that in such cases: 
µthe FCA will expect the firm to act promptly in taking the necessary remedial action with 
its supervisors WRGHDOZLWKWKH)&$¶VFRQFHUQV¶ and that if the firms does not do this 
disciplinary or other enforcement action may follow.93 ,WPD\EHWKDWWKH)&$¶VDSSURDFK
in large part reflects the µWLWIRUWDW¶ enforcement strategy famously championed by Ayres 
and Braithwaite. Those authors argue that such an approach is characterised as 
follows:94 
 
µthe regulator refrains from a deterrent response as long as the firm is co-
operating; but when the firm yields to the temptation to exploit the co-operative 
posture of the regulator and cheats on compliance, then the regulator shifts from 
a coopHUDWLYHWRDGHWHUUHQWUHVSRQVH¶. 
 
Tit for tat places great emphasis on the attitude of the firm, something that the FCA 
recognises is important. Indeed, much has been said recently about culture, both in 
relation to the regulator and in relation to firms. If culture is, as has been suggested, 
µthe underpinning that drives the decisions we PDNHDQGWKHDFWLRQVZHWDNH¶ it may be 
reflected in the attitude of a firm to compliance.95 Looked at this way, there might be a 
role for credible deterrence is deterring non-cooperative and incentivising cooperative 
behaviour. 
 
A second major point to note is that there may be (some) culpability without intention. 
As noted above, a firm may have been reckless or careless, or simply devoted 
insufficient resources to supervision. Such conduct involves fault and can amount to a 
breach of many of the obligations owed by a firm. It could be argued that there remains 
a role for credible deterrence for contraventions based on carelessness or some other 
fault falling short of intention or dishonesty. Significant penalties have been imposed on 
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firms for such breaches.96 The knowledge that a penalty is likely to be applied even for 
non-intentional contravention may have a role in encouraging high standards of 
supervision by firms and individuals. This is part of the justification for strict liability in 
the criminal law and may be particularly effective  backed up by due diligence defences. 
A defendant who can demonstrate that despite committing the actus reus of an offence 
he has all taken reasonable precautions and exercising of all due diligence to avoid the 
offence will not be convicted. This  incentivises firms and individuals to take care to 
avoid unintentional contravention.97 This will (a) make commission of the actus reus less 
likely; and (b) help to ensure that, should it occur, a defence can be made out. Similarly, 
firms and individuals may face financial penalties for their failure to discharge their 
duties appropriately on the basis that this will deter such laxity. Credible deterrence may 
therefore have a role to play even in the absence of intention.  
 
Consequentialist Focus 
A final concern with the focus on deterrence is that the importance of non-
consequentialist approaches might be lost. Since the 1960s at least there has been 
considerable scepticism about the extent to which consequentialist theories such as 
deterrence (and also rehabilitation) should form the basis for punishment, at least for 
individuals.98 While some commentators continue to support such notions, focus has 
perhaps shifted towards the central role of punishment in reflecting wrongdoing. µJust 
deserts¶ theories of punishment required not only that sentences should be determinate, 
but that they should be deserved. Wrongdoing is thought to deserve censure because it 
is wrong, and the censure should reflect that wrong. By focusing on potential results 
rather than actual wrongs, it could be argued that credible deterrence underplays this 
important role for sanctions. It should be noted that the FCA¶VUHJLPHdoes recognise, at 
least to some extent, the importance of non-consequentialist sanctioning. The second 
SULQFLSOHRIWKH)6$¶VSHQDOWLHVUHJLPHLVGLVFLSOLQH± that a firm or individual should be 
penalised for wrongdoing. It seems though that this may have been been lost in the 
incessant rhetoric of credible deterrence.  
 
Conclusions 
The FCA, like the FSA before it, has placed enormous emphasis on the role that pursuing 
a policy of credible deterrence can play in ensuring that the objectives of financial 
regulation are met. There is little doubt that some firms will be deterred from breaking 
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the law by the threat of sanctions such as financial penalties. However, deterrence may 
not be as great a driver of compliance as is sometimes assumed. Firms comply with the 
law for a host of reasons and where breaches occur, many are unintentional. Those firms 
which might be described as amoral calculators can be deterred in theory, but there are 
doubts as to how effectively they are deterred in practice. As in other sectors, formal 
enforcement action and the imposition of substantial penalties remains relatively 
unusual. Where such firms are concerned, deterrence might potentially be made more 
credible in a number of ways, including increasing the detriment that firms feel, 
increasing the probability of enforcement action, re-focusing the target of the 
enforcement action and removing the benefits from contravention. But improving 
deterrence in these ways may lead to claims of disproportionality on the part of the 
regulated. This, in turn, may sometimes reduce the effectiveness of regulation. It is 
important that regulators are responsive in their enforcement strategies, and where they 
do this, regulatory objectives are most likely to be met. The constraints that are placed 
XSRQWKH)&$¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSRZHUVJRVRPe way towards ensuring that such 
responsiveness is embedded. This may mean that the rhetoric of credible deterrence is 
over-stated, but is a price worth paying. 
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